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THE USUAL SUSPECTS

According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran continue to be the primary nation-state actors leveraging influence operations exploiting perceived sociopolitical divisions to undermine confidence in U.S. democratic institutions and shaping public perception toward their interests. These actors employ a variety of methods to conduct foreign malign influence operations, such as using networks of fake online accounts to pose as Americans; enlisting real people to wittingly or unwittingly promote their narratives; and using proxies to launder their influence narratives through an array of overt and covert proxy websites, individuals, and organizations that appear independent. These operations often attempt to exacerbate existing social divides, amplify polarization, push narratives that fit into the nation-state’s objectives, and increasingly, experiment with generative AI to enable their efforts.iii Since at least 2016, we have seen foreign malign influence campaigns specifically promote messaging that undermines public confidence in the security and integrity of the American elections process and exacerbate partisan tensions.

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Finally, pro-PRC influence actors have used AI-generated news anchors to make influence content look like real news content.

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Pro-PRC influence actors spread many fabricated political documents, some allegedly “hacked” from Taiwanese government systems, to try to influence Taiwan’s 2024 elections. Ahead of the vote, ProPRC influence accounts published falsified political documents ranging from DNA tests to fake “hacked” Taiwanese military documents. Fake documents provide fodder for influence accounts and proxy media to push foreign malign influence messaging.

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The PRC has used Western social media production companies to distribute pro-PRC influence content to Western video platforms on issues that could impact their strategic objectives, such as countering accusations of PRC’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang. These companies’ services enable PRC influence content, often produced for domestic Chinese consumption, to spread among global audiences without disclosure that the content was produced by the PRC.

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PRC actors used AI news anchors for fictitious media outlets to spread proPRC content.

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Pro-PRC actors distributed fake leaked Taiwanese government documents before the Taiwanese elections.

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The PRC use influencers to push foreign malign influence content about Xinjiang on Western social media.

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A network of fake accounts developed by the PRC recently pretended to be U.S. military families against Taiwan.

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A network of pro-PRC fake accounts called for protests of a rare-earth mineral processing facility in Texas.

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PRC officials and media exploited data voids to spread conspiracy theories about a U.S. army research facility.

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Pro-PRC disinformation network spread tailored content to U.S. audiences.

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Source: U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

Author: N/A

Format: Report

Link to Original Source